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Abstract
Background. Improving performance of primary care systems in low- and
middle-income countries (LMICs) may be a necessary condition for
achievement of universal health coverage in the age of Sustainable
Development Goals. The Salud Mesoamerica Initiative (SMI), a large-scale,
multi-country program that uses supply-side financial incentives directed at the
central-level of governments, and continuous, external evaluation of public,
health sector performance to induce improvements in primary care
performance in eight LMICs. This study protocol seeks to explain whether and
how these interventions generate program effects in El Salvador and
Honduras.
Methods. This study presents the protocol for a study that uses a realist
evaluation approach to develop a preliminary program theory that hypothesizes
the interactions between context, interventions and the mechanisms that trigger
outcomes. The program theory was completed through a scoping review of
relevant empirical, peer-reviewed and grey literature; a sense-making
workshop with program stakeholders; and content analysis of key SMI
documents. The study will use a multiple case-study design with embedded
units with contrasting cases. We define as a case the two primary care systems
of Honduras and El Salvador, each with different context characteristics. Data
will be collected through in-depth interviews with program actors and
stakeholders, documentary review, and non-participatory observation. Data
analysis will use inductive and deductive approaches to identify causal patterns
organized as ‘context, mechanism, outcome’ configurations. The findings will
be triangulated with existing secondary, qualitative and quantitative data
sources, and contrasted against relevant theoretical literature. The study will
end with a refined program theory. Findings will be published following the
guidelines generated by the Realist and Meta-narrative Evidence Syntheses
study (RAMESES II). This study will be performed contemporaneously with
SMI’s mid-term stage of implementation. Of the methods described, the
preliminary program theory has been completed. Data collection, analysis and
synthesis remain to be completed.
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Introduction
Improving performance of primary care systems in low- and
middle-income countries (LMICs) has been suggested as a necessary condition for the achievement of universal health coverage in
the age of the Sustainable Development Goals1. High-performing
primary care systems not only are the first point of contact for
continuous, coordinated, comprehensive and people-centered
health services, but also provide critical preparedness and response
to public health threats2,3.
The Salud Mesoamerica Initiative (SMI) is a multi-country,
large-scale primary care performance improvement program. It is
the result of a partnership between the governments of the eight
Mesoamerican nation-states, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the Carlos Slim Foundation, the Government of Canada, the
Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and, during earlier
stages, the Government of Spain. The program is aimed at improving reproductive, maternal, neonatal and child health outcomes
among the poorest, rural populations in participating countries.
Intended outcomes include increased availability, utilization, and
effective coverage of primary care services and a reduction in
preventable health inequities. The program’s approach to performance improvement combines the use of high-powered financial
incentives at the government-level and the external verification of
public sector, primary care system performance.
Programs and policies aimed at improving the performance of
health systems have been at the forefront of many public-sector
reforms. Initial waves of reforms in the public sectors of highincome countries were focused on learning and improvement4–7;
subsequent waves of reform targeted public sector accountability and organizational best-practice8,9. Governments in LMICs
adopted and replicated these reforms, oftentimes with the
support of multilateral finance institutions and agencies in the
official development assistance space.
Several generic types of reforms follow the logic of public-sector
interventions10, including (1) political interventions as expressed in
policies and regulations; (2) reforms by laws; (3) intervention by
audit and inspection, based on continuous evaluation of results and
conformity to predefined norms; (4) intervention by management, based on organizational science and management practice,
such as continuous quality improvement or change management
methods, among others; and, (5) intervention by rationalizing professional behaviors such as the introduction of evidence-based
practices and the standard comparison of outcomes by public
sector providers.
In LMIC, accountability-driven reforms have flourished under
the rubric of Results-based Financing (RBF); the health sector
has regularly been at the center of such reforms. The Multilateral
Finance Institutions, the Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria, and the Global Alliance for Immunizations

have financed results-oriented, global health programs, some
of which have targeted health system improvements.
There are ambiguities in the definitions as well as in the scope
and content of RBF programs and policies. In this study protocol, RBF is understood as “any program that rewards the delivery
of one or more outputs or outcomes by one or more incentives,
financial or otherwise, upon verification that the agreed-upon
result has actually been delivered”11; incentives can target health
care providers (supply side), households (demand side), or both.
Performance-based Financing (PBF), is a prevalent type of RBF
in which the incentives are exclusively financial; rewards are
only aimed at providers; and the payments are usually adjusted
for quality. PBF assumes many forms but, in essence, serves the
purpose of reforming the ways in which governments pay health
care providers (individuals and facilities) for the provision of
services.
Accountability-driven interventions in public sector reforms
are designed to reduce the misalignment in incentives between
principals (voters, legislative bodies, executive-level leadership,
funders, etc.) and their agents (program implementers, providers of care, etc.)12,13. Such reforms usually assume that
incentives and rewards serve as powerful motivators for the
achievement of desirable behaviors among utility-maximizing,
rational individuals14–16. These assumptions have conventionally
been based on principal-agent theory14,15, positive agency theory16,
and/or rational choice theory17,18. In recent years, there have been
calls for using a more expansive view of human agency when
discussing motivation and decision-making. Under such views,
humans are not exclusively motivated by rewards and incentives,
but can also be driven to action by intrinsic motivators19. This
perspective has also influenced contemporary research on PBF in
LMIC20,21.
Most of the primary studies that have assessed RBF and PBF
programs in LMIC have characterized the effects of financial
incentives on provider-level motivation and behaviors21–31.
However, the evidence on the effects of RBF on large-system
reforms targeting government-level improvements is scarce;
and studies in LMIC settings are largely absent32–34.
The most-recent systematic review of performance-based financing programs in LMIC concluded that PBF is not a single type
of intervention and that its effects are dependent on the interactions among multiple variables31. Most PBF evaluations to date
have used a narrow focus such as characterizing changes in health
care outputs, while neglecting most other domains of primary care
performance improvement35. Furthermore, the empirical evidence
about how PBF leads to changes in attitudes and behaviors among
public sector actors is scarce35. Domains that have been understudied include, among others, whether and how do extrinsic
and/or intrinsic motivators affect the behaviors, autonomy and
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responsiveness of providers and managers of primary care
delivery systems; the influence that performance measurement
data can have on the behaviors of primary care system actors and
stakeholders; and the negative effects of RBF reforms, such as
gaming, shirking and cream-skimming.
Public-sector reforms tend to incorporate multiple interventions
that generate effects at different levels within organizational
hierarchies, and among different actors and stakeholders. Those
actors and the environments in which they are embedded interact
with each other through time, generating inter-dependencies
and, oftentimes, leading to counter-intuitive, emergent, and
unintended effects. Furthermore, the implementation strategies
and ancillary components of reform programs themselves, such
as the provision of technical assistance or change management
support, can also trigger system changes that need to be better
studied31.
Beyond accountability reforms, studies on performance
management and performance assessment have empirically studied improvement-driven public-sector reforms. Studies of such
reforms in the public sector of the United States have identified
factors that can drive organizational learning and improvement.
For instance, Moynihan and Landuyt36 found that the most influential predictors of organizational improvement and learning were
the use of work-groups as learning forums; the availability of
performance information systems that collect, store and disseminate performance data; the existence of a mission orientation that
builds a sense of shared vision for success and common purpose;
and the existence of organizational slack, such as time and
resources that allow people to think and learn.
Improvement reforms are predicated on the assumption that
the continuous collection, availability and analysis of performance data and information would lead to organizational improvement and learning7. However, despite widespread calls for using
performance data and information to improve decision-making,
the utilization of such data and information can rarely be
guaranteed37. Also, little is known about the conditions under
which performance measurement work or the mechanisms that
lead to system improvement. Studies in evaluation science have
addressed these issues38,39. In this literature, the availability and
dissemination of performance evaluation can influence system
improvement through multi-level changes on individual, interpersonal and/or collective motivation. Considerable research in
evaluation science has been informed by this evidence40–44. We did
not find, however, any study assessing the effects of evaluation
results on health system performance improvement in LMICs.

Study setting
In SMI, governments agree with the IADB to the implementation
of up to three consecutive, 18–24 month programs, aimed at
achieving a series of progressively complex health targets
(including inputs, processes, outputs and outcomes) that are
externally verified by the University of Washington’s Institute for
Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME). Participating governments
contribute domestic funds a-priori to attain the agreed-upon
targets; once domestic funds are made available and targets

are agreed, SMI matches the domestic contribution with grant
financing on a 1:1 ratio. Afterwards, the IADB enters into formal
performance contracts with each government. In the contract,
SMI commits to reimbursing half of the initially invested
domestic funds contingent on the achievement of the agreed-upon
performance targets45.
Country-specific performance frameworks with geographical
targeting of the poorest, rural populations, were negotiated with
each government at the start of the program and have remained
stable through time. A pass-or-fail policy was agreed, according to which a government has to achieve 80% or more of the
approximately ten (10) targets that make-up any given performance framework to be eligible for the reimbursement
of half of the initial domestic contribution. Table 1 lists some of
the targets agreed by El Salvador and Honduras.
As the agency in charge of external verification of government
performance, IHME conducts a full-scale quantitative measurement that follows SMI’s sequential process of implementation.
Before each country program starts, a baseline is collected and
its results disseminated. After that, at the end of each 18 to
24-month implementation projects, IHME collects household
and facility-based data to evaluate the achievement of agreedupon results. Phase 1 programs started in a staggered fashion
in 2011; phase-2 programs will finish during 2017; a third and
final phase will start in 2018 and go into 2020. Program targets
during phase 1 were focused on adherence to protocols,
availability of resources and, in general, structure and process
performance. During phase 2, targets were focused on outputs,
and phase 3 will be centered on health outcomes, including but
not limited to, coverage of exclusive breastfeeding, increased
modern contraceptive prevalence rates, effective coverage of
antenatal care and institutional deliveries, post-partum and postnatal care coverage, and in some cases, reductions in the prevalence
of anemia and effective coverage of measles vaccination, measured
in blood46. After each round of performance evaluation, results
are aggregated and disseminated in each country through policy
dialogue workshops convened by the government and involving
the IADB and IHME.
SMI’s original theory of change (Figure 1) hypothesized that the
use of supply-side financial incentives directed to central-level
ministries in each participating government (Ministries of Finance
and Health) would focus their attention on accounting for the
achievement of their own agreed-upon health targets. The success
of this hypothesis rested on four causal pathways. The first established that the three consecutive, biannual rounds of external
verification of performance by IHME would generate sustained
pressure on governments for the production of health results. The
second pathway proposed that ongoing dialogic, participatory
dissemination of data, information and evidence would lead to
progressive improvements in the quality of care services and
improved, aggregate performance in each participating country’s
primary care system. Anticipated population-level health effects
were also contingent on increasing domestic pro-poor health
spending and expanding the demand for high impact health
interventions among beneficiary populations.
Page 4 of 15

First Phase

First Phase

Neonates with complications (low birthweight, prematurity, asphyxia
and sepsis) treated according to the standard.
Newborns who received neonatal care after birth according to the
standard in the last two years.

Women who received postpartum contraceptives in the last year.
Women with obstetric complication (pre-eclampsia with severe
symptoms, hemorrhage and sepsis) treated according to national
standard.

Percentage of mothers who gave their children (aged 0–59 months)
oral rehydration salts and zinc in the last episode of diarrhea
Percentage of women of childbearing age (15–49 years) whose most
recent delivery was attended by trained personnel in a health unit in
the last two years.
Third Phase
Pregnant women treated at health centers in the last year who had at
least one preconception consultation with quality in the year before
their pregnancy.
Percentage of women of childbearing age (15–49 years) currently
using (or whose partner uses) a modern contraceptive method.

Percentage of women of childbearing age (15–49) currently using (or
whose partner uses) a modern contraceptive method.
Percentage of women of childbearing age (15–49) who had a prenatal
checkup according to best practices with a physician or nurse before
week 12 in their most recent pregnancy
Percentage of children aged 6–23 months who had a hemoglobin
value of < 110 g/L. (Prevalence of anemia in children aged 6–23
months)

Percentage of pregnant women enrolled in the prenatal register who
had a prenatal checkup with a physician or nurse before week 12 of
pregnancy.
Second Phase

Review of national policy for micronutrient products distribution to
children aged 6–23 months
Inclusion in the standard on proper therapeutic dosage of zinc for
diarrhea treatment in children under five (20 mg of zinc for 10–14 days
with each episode).

Number of community health units with supply of four modern family
planning methods (injectable, barrier, oral and intra-uterine devices).

-1

-1

-1

-1

-1

-1

86.2

4.4

46.5

47.5

53.5

67

No

No

11

Women (aged 15–49 years) who currently use (or whose partner uses)
10 a modern family planning method
Women (aged 15–49 years) whose most recent delivery was attended
7 PP by qualified personnel in a health unit in the last two years
Newborns who received neonatal care within 3 days following birth
15PP according to standard in the last two years
Women with obstetric complication (sepsis, hemorrhage and
eclampsia) managed according to the standard in their most recent
25 PP pregnancy in the last two years
Neonates with complications (prematurity, low birth weight, asphyxia
and sepsis) managed according to hospital level standards in the
25 PP previous two years
Prevalence of anemia in children aged 6–23 months (Children aged
80% 6–23 months with hemoglobin levels < 110 g/L)

Mothers who report giving their children aged 6–23 months at least 50
94.2 packets of micronutrient powder in the last six months (36m)
Third Phase

Women (aged 15–49) whose most recent delivery was attended by
62.5 qualified personnel in a health unit in the last 2 years
Neonates with complications (prematurity, low birth weight, asphyxia
and sepsis) managed according to hospital standards in the previous
36.5 two years
Women with obstetric complication (sepsis, hemorrhage and
eclampsia) managed according to national standards in their most
24.4 recent delivery in the last two years

Maternal deaths reported and investigated according to standards in
77 2013
Second Phase
Women (aged 15–49) who received at least four prenatal checkups
according to best practices by qualified personnel during their most
60.5 recent pregnancy in the last 2 years

Primary and second care level health units supplied with family
65 planning methods according to ministry of health’s current standard
Maternal & Child health clinics with permanent availability of
medications and inputs necessary for treatment of obstetric and
Yes neonatal emergency
Second level health care units with permanent availability of
medications, inputs and equipment necessary for treatment of
Yes obstetric and neonatal emergency

Health centers with permanent availability of micronutrient powder for
14,681 38,661 supplementation at home

HONDURAS

Baseline Target Indicators

EL SALVADOR

Number of families enrolled in Family Health Teams

Indicators

Table 1. Summary of performance frameworks in El Salvador and Honduras.

35.3

-2

-2

-2

68.6

66.8

0.1

11

6.9

68.6

23.7

N. A.

0

62.5

86.4

0

Baseline

25.3

25 PP

25PP

8PP

8PP

76.8

15.1

51

36.9

76.6

33.7

80%

2

80%

90%

80%

Target
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Figure 1. SMI initial theory of change.

While the program’s original theory of change identified several
causal pathways, it did not explain how its main interventions
would trigger outcomes, nor did it provide, either, a-priori
explanations about the role that each country’s policy context
could play in moderating the effects of program interventions.
The SMI partnership appears to have embraced a high degree of
flexibility in implementation to facilitate governmental buy-in. In
2011, the partners agreed on a set of common principles including a focus on external and independent measurement of results,
accountability and transparency, and country ownership. These
principles established the institutional boundaries that, in turn,
allowed the IADB to negotiate country-specific performance
contracts, results frameworks and evaluation plans with each
participating government. They also granted implementing partners a high degree of flexibility in the design of each country’s
multi-phased implementation plans and, also, led to performance
contracts based on a few high-order principles (country ownership, a focus on results, pro-equity, cost-effective interventions,
measurability and transparency) that were originally agreed among
the funders and the IADB, and reflected in the program’s operating
model.
In the two countries under study, El Salvador and Honduras, the
program’s focus on country ownership led to each government
deciding how to best deploy SMI’s non-reimbursable resources
and their own domestic financing to increase the likelihood of
achieving programmatic success. For instance, El Salvador had
undergone a health system reform in the early 2010s, which

coincided with the beginning of SMI implementation. The
government decided to focus its targets on results that leveraged
one of the reform’s central tenets, the provision of universal
primary care services through community-centered, Family
Health Teams47. Honduras, in turn, had started in the late 2000s
a large-scale pilot of contracting-out and pay-for-performance in
the delivery of primary care services48. The government thus
decided to leverage its own performance-driven policies and
programs and has thus implemented SMI in municipalities that had
already acquired experience with RBF.

Methods
Methodological approach
The evidence gaps identified in our literature review have led to
recent calls for new approaches in the evaluation of complex
public-sector reforms, such as PBF30,35,49,50. It has been argued
that realist evaluation provides a valuable and relevant approach
for assessing interventions that involve changing human decisions and actions51,52. Realist evaluation is a form of theorydriven inquiry based on the premise an evaluation needs to answer
“what worked, how, in what circumstances and for whom”, rather
than the conventional question “Did the program work?”52. The
appeal of this approach, compared to other theory-driven methods,
lies in its explicit foundations in critical realism – an epistemology located between positivism and relativism52. Such perspective
contends that program interventions bring about social change
through underlying, usually hidden causal mechanisms, and considers the role of context as indispensable in explaining causality.
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This study addresses two research questions: (1) What are the
effects of using supply-side financial incentives on the performance
of the primary care systems in Honduras and El Salvador? How
are those effects produced? Under what contextual factors are these
effects produced in each country? And, (2) What are the effects
of continuous external verification of performance in the two
countries under study? How are those effects produced? Under
what contextual factors are these effects produced in each country?
While there is no single way to implement a realist evaluation
study, as the experience with its use and applications grow, various
authors have adopted and adapted Pawson and Tilley’s approach and
identified a series of steps that are described below52–57.
Developing a preliminary program theory. Realist evaluation
starts with the development of a program theory that serves as a
hypothesis about the ways in which outcomes are produced through
the interaction between interventions and context conditions,
and mediated by hidden, not-observable mechanisms. The latter
have been defined as the ideas and opportunities triggered
among program actors and stakeholders in response to program
interventions57. The process of testing and refining program
theories usually relies upon quantitative and qualitative methods
and culminates with a refined program theory53.
This stage in the study was completed through complementary
approaches, including (1) review of program design documents;
(2) discussions with program designers to gain in-depth
understanding of the original causal links between program
interventions and expected outcomes; (3) scoping review of the
literature, focused on identifying theories and empirical evidence
addressing similar processes of primary care system change; and,

(4) facilitation of a workshop with IADB stakeholders, which
helped understand their assumptions about how program interventions effects could be produced in the two countries under
study. This process of making explicit the assumptions held by
program stakeholders before data is collected is an essential
aspect in realist evaluation. As a result of these various activities,
the research team formulated a preliminary program theory.
In a separate, ongoing study we will perform a realist synthesis
of performance improvement; performance measurement/
evaluation; and, results- and performance-based financing. The
process started with a scoping review of social science theories
related to the two research questions and led to the mapping and
synthesis of theories explaining the contextual factors and causal
mechanisms of relevance to this study protocol. This will be
followed by a search for primary studies, systematic reviews,
realist evaluations and realist syntheses on the themes above and
as required by our research questions. The search for the scoping
review was done on Science Direct, JSTOR, and Goodle Scholar
using a snowballing technique. The theories that were mapped are
summarized in Supplementary File 1.
Based on a synthesis of the results from the scoping review,
and informed by the knowledge acquired from the stakeholder
workshop and the document review, a preliminary program theory
was developed (Figure 2). It is summarized below as a series of
inter-linked propositions:

➢ The

use of (1) high-powered, supply-side financial
incentives aimed at central-level government actors and
stakeholders (intervention 1) and the implementation
of continuous, external evaluation and verification of

Figure 2. Preliminary program theory.
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primary care service performance (intervention 2) supports country priorities through continuous policy dialogue, technical support, and purposive dissemination of
performance results (implementation strategy);

➢

 eading to the adoption of innovations in supplies, inforL
mation, and workforce management (outcome 1); the
adoption of performance management reforms such
as continuous process and quality improvement (outcome 2); the introduction of policies and regulations that
promote primary care improvement and/or reductions
in preventable inequities (outcome 3); and, improved,
population-level health outputs and outcomes (outcome 4).

➢ The behavioral changes listed above occur at various levels
within the primary care system, as follows;
o A
 t the individual level, they satisfy psychological needs
such as autonomy, competence and relatedness and/or
the need to upgrade or improve personal goals and
self-efficacy (individual-level mechanisms)58–63;
o A
 t the interpersonal level, because of the aggregate
internalization by multiple individual actors and stakeholders, of changes in ideas and opportunities; and/
or through a growing sense of public service and/or
community service (individual and interpersonal
mechanisms)19,39.
o C
 ollective level changes could also be triggered
whereby the ideas and opportunities of a sufficiently
large number of individual actors internalize or
assimilate new norms, routines and behaviors which,
in turn, spread across inter-organizational and social
networks64,65, leading to the emergence of new organizational culture and collective behavior (outcome);

➢ Collective inter-organizational-level changes may further
lead to the institutionalization and collective assimilation
of aggregate individual- and interpersonal-level behaviors
through imitation and/or the adoption of new professional
and cultural norms, and/or innovative, pro-performance
policies (outcome)33 thus, increasing the likelihood of the
production of population-level health effects (outcome)
and, potentially, transforming the primary care system in a
sustained fashion (outcome)32,33.
Global, institutional, and organizational contextual conditions are
also needed for the attainment of program outcomes and for the
triggering of the above mechanisms. They include, at the global
and sub-regional levels, the existence of favorable conditions such
as influential issue-specific global agendas that match existing
governmental priorities or a history of interactions between
national health agencies and their agendas, and between those and
official development aid agencies and their agendas66–69. At the
country-level, the availability of solid institutional environments
(laws, regulations, ongoing public-sector reforms, etc.) can create
windows of opportunity for the introduction of policy innovations

and, also, facilitate convergence between domestic policies and
programs, and the externaly-funded interventions. Finally, preexisting environmental conditions, such as the organizational
capacity to absorve new knowledge or the presence of climates
that support and enable change, have also been associated with
increased assimilation of service innovations70,71 and need to be
considered in the characterization of context.
Study design. In this step the preliminary program theory will be
tested, further developed, and validated or rejected. A multiple
case-study design with embedded units with contrasting cases
was selected72. The contrasting case approach aligns well with the
proposition that the two different country contexts in Honduras and
El Salvador can trigger to-be-identified mechanisms that generate
program results. Given the system-wide and reinforcing effects
of the two interventions under study, we define each country’s
primary care system as the unit of analysis. Within each country, at least two high-performing municipal-level primary care
delivery systems will be analyzed as embedded sub-cases, each
with its unique contextual and service delivery structure.
This evaluation is an 18-month study running from May 2017 to
December 2018, and executed contemporaneously with SMI’s
mid-term stage of implementation. The study seeks to maximize
diversity in institutional and policy context to increase the likelihood of identifying variations in policy and program conditions
and characterizing the process of change generated to date by
the program in one low- and one middle-income country, respectively Honduras and El Salvador. Both countries have to date been
exemplars of high-performance, which in SMI is defined as the
continuous achievement of 80% or more of the targets agreed
between each government and the IADB, and externally verified
by IHME.
In each country, the study will assess the context, interventions,
implementation approaches, and program effects, intended and
otherwise. At the central level of government, the study will characterize program antecedents, policy and organizational context,
primary care system’s stewardship and policy-setting, and overall
program management and implementation. At the local, municipal level, it will explore primary care delivery through Family
Health Teams in El Salvador, and on public as well as non-profit,
pay-for-performance providers. Primary data collection will
include the methods described below.
Data collection methods. Realist evaluation is method neutral,
and the nature of the research, the evaluation questions and the
preliminary program theory determine the choice of study design
and methodology52,57. The primary data collection methods to be
used in this study include in-depth interviews, non-participatory
obervation, and document review.
In-depth interviews with key informants in each country will be
conducted to identify individual, inter-personal and collective
or organizational factors that may affect primary care system
performance in each country under study. These interviews
will also be used to elicit contextual elements that could act as
barriers or facilitators for the delivery of SMI’s interventions.
Page 8 of 15

Gates Open Research 2018, 2:1 Last updated: 12 JAN 2018

In this study, we aim to gain a high-level understanding of the
causal mechanisms and pathways of performance improvement,
as reflected in the preliminary program theory. SMI intervenes
at the central as well as local levels of the primary care system,
generating hypothesized feedback effects between both. The
evaluation aims require the characterization of the interactions
and inter-dependencies that occur among multiple actors in the
primary care system; this would allow resulting data to help
explain the complex nature of the process of performance
improvement, and ultimately, help the team validate or revise the
preliminary program theory. Accordingly, in-depth key informant
interviews will be conducted with four sets of actors: (1) Country
policy- and program implementation actors in Honduras and
El Salvador; (2) Health care providers at primary care facilities
in Honduras and El Salvador; (3) Performance verification and
evaluation stakeholders at IHME; and, (4) Program designers at
the IADB. Key informants will be recruited using a purposeful
sampling approach73. Subsequently, the sample will be snowballed
from the initial set of informants.
The study’s sample size cannot be determined a-priori, but we
expect to conduct approximately 80 key informant interviews,
which will ultimately be determined based on theoretical
saturation74. Respondents will be invited to participate voluntarily
in the study; no compensation will be provided for participation.
Interview guides will be used to conduct in-depth interviews; a
series of probes will also be developed a-priori (Supplementary
File 2). Interviews with country actors and stakeholders will be
conducted in Spanish by bilingual members of the research team;
IADB and IHME respondents will be interviewed in English. All
interviews will be recorded and transcribed verbatim and, when
applicable, professionally translated into English.
To document the process of policy dialogue, the study will use
non-participant observation during the dissemination of the
external verification of performance for the second phase of
the program, in early 2018. The research team will document
the process followed in the policy dialogue session, the agenda,
components and intended objectives, the sequence of events that
transpire following the results, and the reactions and actions
by country actors and stakeholders. Summary memos of the
observations will be generated to be maintained in the project files.
To further understand policy and program context, the study will
review key program documents pertinent to the design, implementation and evaluation of SMI interventions in El Salvador and
Honduras. Specific attention will be given to documenting the
policy and program context in each country, identifying the
implementation strategies in each country, assessing performance and evaluation frameworks, and identifying secondary data
sources that could be used for further triangulation during the data
analysis stage. A complete list of reviewed documents will be
maintained, and included as a supplemental file with the final
report of findings.

Data analysis
Data analysis of the in-depth key informant interviews will be
conducted using an integrative methodology that merges both
inductive and deductive approaches74. We will construct a set of

a-priori codes drawing from the realist evaluation context, intervention, mechanism, and outcome structure, relevant theoretical
literature domains, the stakeholder workshop, and the document
review described above. This will be combined with emergent
inductive codes identified from a rigorous open coding process.
In an initial stage of data analysis, two coders will analyze a subset of transcripts in an iterative and systematic manner using the
constant comparison method, and afterwards finalize the codebook
through negotiation75. Subsequent transcripts will be coded by three
experienced coders using the final codebook.
The coded data will be appraised using two complementary analytic approaches. The research team will use iterative conceptual
and pattern coding to identify major emergent inductive themes.
At the conclusion of the process, the codes will be arranged into
the four major categories of context, intervention, mechanism, and
outcomes. The team will scan within each category, “vertically”,
to identify commonalities and thematic elements, e.g. multiple
combinations of contexts that could facilitate/inhibit the interventions; or a confluence of interventions that are catalytic and
reinforce one another, etc. Furthermore, the data will be analyzed
across categories, or “horizontally,” to identify causal patterns
whereby certain outcomes are interrelated to program interventions that trigger mechanisms among primary care system
actors under specific contextual conditions. We expect these two
analytic approaches to be complementary, and to allow building
context-mechanism- outcome (CMO) configurations that will
then be gauged to determine which patterns plausibly explain how
each intervention generated the observed effects, expected and
otherwise. The final thematic structure will be used to refine the
preliminary program theory. Data analysis will be done with nVivo
Version 11 for Mac.
Evaluation results will be completed by integrating findings from
the different data collection methods (interviews, notes from
non-participatory observations, and secondary document analysis) to confirm, reject or further develop the preliminary program
thyeory and the causal patterns identified. The findings will also be
contrasted with secondary quantitative and qualitative data sets
collected by IHME and others and with social science literature in
search for mechanism-oriented theory that may provide explanation for the emerging causal patterns. The results will be a series of
CMO conﬁgurations that are backed up by the empirical data that
provide plausible causal explanations for the observed findings.
Synthesis and refined program theory. In this step the research
team will link the emergent CMO configurations to the preliminary
program theory, leading to the adoption, modification, or rejection of the preliminary program theory and will, then, formulate
plausible explanations of how and why high-powered, supply side
incentives and external verification of performance generate the
observed results. The resulting explanations for the observed
program effects will then be compiled in the form of narrative
summaries, tables, and/or causal loop diagrams. The end of the
study product is a final, refined program theory.
Study findings will be published in peer-reviewed periodicals and
disseminated locally among policy-makers in the two countries to
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be studied. The presentation of findings will be made following
the Realist And Meta-narrative Evidence Syntheses study
(RAMESES II) that was designed to provide guidance on quality assurance and uniform reporting and improve quality and
consistency in the reporting of realist evaluations76,77.

Quality control
A set of measures will be taken to increase the validity of the study in
terms of reflexivity, credibility and confirmability, and enhance the
trustworthiness, transparency, and accountability of the research78.
All researchers will engage in the introspective practice of maintaining ‘personal biases memos’ to make explicit all self-identified
biases and pre-conceptions that may effect the research process78.
All analytic decision notes and memos, biases memos, document
analysis syntheses, interview guides, research team meeting
agendas and minutes, and analysis outputs including coded
transcripts, conceptual frameworks, tables, etc. will be preserved
to provide a verifiable audit trail.

Discussion
The refined program theory and CMO configurations resulting
from this study have several anticipated uses and applications. Program implementers like the IADB and Salvadorian and Honduran
government actors, for instance, can use the findings to consider
introducing adjustments in SMI’s implementation during its third
and final phase (2018–2020). Also, given the study’s focus on
exploring the linkages between ongoing, pre-existing policy
mandates and priorities, it is plausible to expect study findings
to be of relevance to further improve the evaluation and subsequent re-design of domestic health policies in El Salvador and
Honduras. Program evaluators like IHME and other research
groups, can use program findings to enhance ongoing evaluation
activities or to inform the design of new evaluations that deepen
one or more of the various casual patterns identified. For example,
our research team intends to use the emerging CMO configurations
in the area of performance management to inform the design of
a new study to explore whether and how SMI quality improvement interventions produce gains in primary care performance.
We also expect program findings to set the stage for further realist
evaluations in other large-scale primary care reform in contexts
other than Mesoamerica.
Another source of complexity in this study arises from the
significant evidence gaps that we identified and from the multiple
fields that would need to be rigorously studied to properly address
the various outcomes generated by accountability and performance management reforms. As discussed before, such outcomes
can occur at different levels of analysis (individual, organizational
and collective) and in different contexts (high- as well as LMIC).
Not only does this type of research demand inter- and multidisciplinary capabilities within research teams, but it also
calls for rigorous, systematic assessment and mapping of the
evidence gaps79,80. Theory-based program evaluations of primary care performance improvement would also benefit from the
publication of realist syntheses that rigorously appraise the literature in search of context-mechanism-outcomes and program
theory81,82. Such studies would not only facilitate the work of

research teams currently addressing primary care performance
improvement research, but would also strategically shape
future health system research agendas, particularly in LMIC.
The research team has faced several challenges in shaping this
study’s hypotheses, or preliminary program theory. Many of these
challenges are common to other realist evaluations and have been
discussed elsewhere53,83. One such challenge pertains to settling
on an unambiguous and precise definition for what constitutes a
mechanism. Several definitions in the literature are of a descriptive nature and focus on well-known features of mechanisms such
as them being unobservable, context-specific and being able to
generate effects. We settled on a definition of mechanisms as
the ideas and opportunities triggered among program actors and
stakeholders in response to program interventions57. Such an
approach is consistent with a view of social change according to
which the beliefs, choices and opportunities of individual actors
and the interactions among them (micro-level) are the main drivers
of social change. This approach also recognizes that the “macro,”
social and cultural environment in which these individual
actors are embedded can shape social change by means of the
internalization of collective values, norms and institutions among
individual actors84,85.
Based on these considerations, this study aims to, first, explore
plausible causal explanations based on individual or group-based
ideas and opportunities among program actors and stakeholders and, second, to ground those observations on an understanding of the policy and program context in which those actors and
stakeholders are embedded. Therefore, we expect that any explanation of primary care system performance improvement needs to
address both individual, micro-level, as well as collective,
macro-level properties that “are not meaningfully attributed to
individuals”84. Three specific types of mechanisms that explain
social change are thus of interest to this study86.
Situational mechanisms refer to the macro, organizational-level
environment in which SMI actors and their social interactions or
linkages occur, including domestic policy-makers, ministry of
health managers and primary care providers, among others. It also
includes SMI stakeholders such as the implementation agency
(the IADB) and the external evaluators of performance (IHME).
This type of mechanism operates in the direction from macro environment to individual actors (macro-to-micro change). Actionformation mechanisms are those that explain how actors’ ideas
and opportunities influence individual behaviors across the primary
care system. In this type of mechanism, the interaction between
program interventions and context, trigger changes in individuals’ ideas and opportunities that further influence others in the
same social system. This type of mechanism can generate effects
that spread from an individual actor to additional actors (micro to
micro change). Finally, transformational mechanisms provide
explanations of how the sum of new behaviors of multiple individual actors in the primary care system bring about change across
the entities that conform the primary care system’s macro
environment such as norms and institutions (micro-to-macro
social change).
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Due to limitations in scope, this study can only plausibly
characterize some of the “macro” and “micro” mechanisms triggered during SMI’s initial stages up until its current, mid-term
stage (2011–2017). It is also plausible to characterize intended and
unintended effects generated during this same period. Findings
can also be used identify propositions about downstream effects
that could occur or not during the final implementation phase
(2018–2020) and about the mechanisms that could help sustain
desirable effects after implementation ends. Longer-term,
transformational mechanisms, their anticipated effects and the
underlying context-mechanism-outcome configurations will,
however, remain outside our scope of work.
Another challenge in this study refers to the contested nature of the
current definitions used to characterize the interventions that conform RBF, PBF or any of the various reforms that use supply-side
incentives to drive accountability in public sector actors and, as is
the case in SMI, across the entire primary care system. Like others
before us, we settled on the definitions provided by Musgrove11, but
we remain cognizant of the fact that PBF is not a single intervention and that its “ancillary” components can themselves generate
system effects31. In this respect, this study frames SMI interventions as generic types of public-sector reforms aimed at inducing
accountability and organizational improvement and learning. Given
that the challenges in defining what these large-scale reforms
contain in specific contexts –both in high and well as less-developed nations- the use of a realist evaluation approach will likely
contribute to the theorizing of how and why specific contexts
generate health and non-health effects in primary care performance
management reforms.
Finally, given the method-neutrality that is central to realist
evaluations, this study also faced the challenge of settling on a
final sequence and content of research methods and activities.
We decided to, first, follow the steps described by Vareilles and
Marchal in relatively similar realist evaluations and studies53,57,
but also relied on the Realist and Meta-narrative Evidence Syntheses study that provides guidance on how to improve quality and

consistency in the reporting of realist evaluations77. By aligning
protocol design to these guidelines, we expect that the furture
publication of this study’s findings will adhere to current best
practice.
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I recommend publication with minor revisions.
As this is a study protocol as opposed to the actual study, there are no datasets at this time so the answer
to the question, "Are the datasets clearly presented in a useable and accessible format" can only be partly
or actually NA since the data will be collected using the study protocol that is proposed for publication and
eventually that will be carried out to assess the impact of SMI.
Overall, I find this to be a thorough and carefully thought out study protocol that will provide important
insights into how the results produced by SMI were actually created. As such, this study protocol will
shed important insights into how a large, complex intervention across multiple countries and over time
produced the quite astounding results that marked the success of SMI. Even as we have seen the
positive results from the regular evaluations and can easily see the quite significant improvements
countries that are part of this initiative have registered, important questions as to what factors actually
drove the impact seen remain only partially answered. This study will shed important light on these
questions.
I only have a few minor quibbles regarding the article.
1. The authors use PBF and RBF almost interchangeably and sometimes use both terms. I think it
might be less confusing to the reader to define terms up front and then use one term.
2. Page 3, paragraph 8, says that studies on the effects of RBF on large scale system reforms are
largely absent. Later on the authors cite a systematic review. In fact, there have been a number of
systematic reviews of RBF programs beyond the one cited. For example, Andy Oxman has several
papers that review (critically) the experience with RBF. Miller and Singer (2013) is another.
3. I also think that in the area of RBF, it's important to not focus only on LMIC experience as RBF is an
instrument that has been used and is being used extensively. The Quality and Outcomes
Framework (QOF) in the UK NHS is an example. Peter Smith has a number of papers that reviews
that experience and Cheryl Cashin and Peter Smith have a paper on how RBF links to the larger
issue of Strategic Purchasing.
4. Perhaps my strongest comment is on page 7, paragraph 6, regarding the program theory section. I
think it's quite possible to formulate a hypothesis that SMI was not primarily a classic extrinsic
financial incentive program but possibly much more an extrinsic non pecuniary program where the
rewards were doing well amongst your peers. When you look at the incentive rewards, its difficult
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financial incentive program but possibly much more an extrinsic non pecuniary program where the
rewards were doing well amongst your peers. When you look at the incentive rewards, its difficult
to see how such relatively small financial rewards could incent behavior. The counterpoint to this
argument might be that the funding provided by the SMI donors was flexible and in these heath
systems flexible funding is often rare and highly prized but that too is an issue deserving of further
investigation. However, if the funding is small and relatively insignificant, the question is then what
drove the behavior and actions taken. A factor worthy of investigation is the SMI approach of
engaging multiple countries in a form of joint competition. Ministers of Health were all engaged on
SMI and there is some anecdotal evidence that the approach of having them compete together,
each trying to attain the targets they set for their own country, created a form of competition or at
least a common forum where not performing well would be seen as a distinct negative outcome,
thereby conferring strong incentives for them to perform well or endeavor to make sure their health
system performs strongly. This kinds of peer effects are known to be powerful in behavioral
economics and so we should look for them in this study as well.
Is the rationale for, and objectives of, the study clearly described?
Yes
Is the study design appropriate for the research question?
Yes
Are sufficient details of the methods provided to allow replication by others?
Yes
Are the datasets clearly presented in a useable and accessible format?
Partly
Competing Interests: I was Deputy Director at the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation during the time
that the SMI program was designed and implemented. I also was responsible for the SMI program for two
years. I know and used to work with the lead author of this article when we were both employed by the Bill
and Melinda Gates Foundation.
I have read this submission. I believe that I have an appropriate level of expertise to confirm that
it is of an acceptable scientific standard.
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